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With the foreign currency crisis in 1997 in Korea, necessity of universal welfare 
that the government should guarantee the basic livelihood of people systematically 
was suggested due to the increase of low-incomers.  Accordingly, the National 
Basic Livelihood Security System (NBLSS) was introduced in October, 2000, 
which made the targets of cash benefits increase by including the workable poor 
who had not been covered by cash benefits subject to participating in self-support 
programs.  The NBLSS is significant because it is the last social security net that 
the government guarantees the minimum livelihood of people as their right.   
 Therefore, in this study, it was assumed that special beneficiaries receiving 
more benefits than regular beneficiaries would depend more on welfare, and their 
work incentive would be lower than regular beneficiaries.  And the beneficiaries 
under the NBLSS were divided into special beneficiaries and regular beneficiaries, 
and then it was reviewed on how their economic activities, work days and earned 
income affect their work incentive. 
 As a result of research, the work incentive of special beneficiaries was 
positive (+), and that of regular beneficiaries was rather negative (-).  To interpret in 
another way, about 19% of special beneficiaries were workable, being 109 out of 576; and 
about 53% of regular beneficiaries were workable. Under this assumption, The fact that 
above 50% of regular beneficiaries have negative tendency in work incentive shows that 




beneficiaries among whom 20% or less are workable have positive tendency in work 
incentive shows that they work to supplement lacking benefit individually. Eventually, it 
could be reinterpreted that all beneficiaries provide the minimal amount of work to 
main their eligibility for benefits. 
 With coming benefit system for special beneficiaries by levels, which will 
be introduced in 2014, it is intended in this study to analyze the work incentive 
related to work ability, which has been evaluated in various aspects with every 
attempt for system improvement, and the work incentive related to beneficiary type, 
which has never been discussed except for labor supply. Also, this study of using 
the transverse section data differently from the previous studies of having used 
longitudinal section data contains information at a certain time. However, this study 
is intended to verify the work incentive of beneficiaries of different benefit types 
(special & regular) at a certain time, with the concept that the work incentive pattern 
is more influenced by personal properties of each beneficiary rather than by 
continuously influenced by the NBLSS because the work incentive pattern of a 
subject beneficiary, which appear with the changes of benefit level with time 
intervals is not a factor of maturation with time passed. 
 
Keywords: SpecialBeneficiary, Work Incentive, the NBLSS, Labor Policy, 
Public Assistances 
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In modern welfare countries, the income-guaranteeing policy for poverty prevention 
is composed of social security insurance, social security benefit, public assistance, 
tax benefits, etc. Public assistance basically aims at guaranteeing the basic 
livelihood of people in poverty through fair income transfer to them. However, 
importance has been put on the objective to promote employment and self-
sufficiency in the labor market. Since 1990‟s, the worldwide flow of public 
assistance policy has been changed to the direction of focusing on the employment-
promoting policy which helps the entry of the poor into the labor market rather than 
guaranteeing their income through public transfer.  
The labor-inducing policy reinforced in such a trend has been 
characterized by active labor market policy and labor-related welfare policy as the 
basic frame with the goal to make beneficiaries independent through jobs (from 
welfare to work), with which inducement to financial independence through work 
as an attracting factor and strengthened sanctions as a whipping factor have been 
combined. 




provide appropriate level of benefits to needy people with limited resources, but not 
to decrease the willingness for work of beneficiaries or non-beneficiaries; and 
eventually to achieve economic efficiency, income guarantee and inducement to 
work.  
However, those three eventual objectives have conflicts in reality, and 
cause many problems when policies are set up. If economic efficiency and 
inducement to work are focused on, there may be a possibility of not providing 
appropriate level of benefits to needy people; and it needs income guarantee for 
low-income class to maintain the life quality, but it may cause side effects of 
dependence of beneficiaries on welfare, antipathy of taxpayers and increase of 
public expenditures. The public assistance system of any country couldn‟t have 
solved this problem completely, and countries have been designing the system by 
combining the objectives according to the social agreement and the priorities of 
policy objectives (Black, et al., 1999).  
 The National Basic Livelihood Security System (NBLSS) of Korea have 
two objectives of basic livelihood security and self-sufficiency promotion. The 
system has been successful in alleviating immediate poverty and supporting 
livelihood of people in poverty, but it is doubtful if such support has led to 
achievement of their self-sufficiency.   




apprehension that the beneficiaries are being demotivated to work and the tendency 
of depending on welfare and trying not to be excluded from the benefits is getting 
severe. This system has the nature of workfare which obligates the workable 
beneficiaries to work subject to conditional public assistance, and the nature as a 
protective system for the working poor that low-income workers are paid in cash 
also subject to satisfaction of certain requirements (Loedemeland Dahl, 2000). 
 Due to such complex natures, the NBLSS is connected with many systems 
related to social security. In terms of protecting the jobless and protecting the 
working poor who are involved in the minimum wage system to secure the 
minimum level income in the labor market, its relation with the unemployment 
insurance system should be considered. It not only has the nature as unemployment 
insurance and but also integrates active labor market policies covering the 
employment stabilization and career capacity development. In addition, deduction 
on earned income is implemented under this system. The tax system is related to 
income and tax deduction (Hwang, 2001). 
A number of models have been published regarding inducement of the 
beneficiaries of public assistance to work and their work types. First, it is argued 
between the income effect caused by the income earned from public transfer 
without working and the substitution effect caused by the reduced income due to tax.  
Second, the models about whether the poor choose work or choose benefits by 










, class cultural model
4
, etc. 
According to Arkinson (1993), those models are the hypotheses in which many 
factors in reality are abstracted, and much more complex economic and non-
economic variables are considered when each beneficiary of public assistance 
determines whether to work or not. 
On the basis of those models, the policies of work incentive are being 
implemented. First, the policies are to promote the working desire of beneficiaries 
by reorganizing the benefit calculating method, additional benefits, period for 
benefit payment, etc. considering that the benefit system of public assistance 
decisively affects the work incentive of beneficiaries, and the supplementation 
principle and the integrated benefit system under the NBLSS have a possibility of 
weakening the work incentive of beneficiaries. Second, those are to promote work 
activities for positive aspects by providing financial incentives for low-income 
earners, and the well-known models are income disregard under the public 
assistance system of many countries, Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) of the U. S., 
                                           
1 The theory that workers determine the entry into the labor market and laboring hours subject to the 
condition that the utility coming to them can be maximized by unifying the interest from labor and the 
money paid for it as the concept of utility (Moffitt 1992, Edin&Lein 1997). 
2
The theory that macro-economic condition represented by the unemployment rate is the 
main factor of determining the employment of beneficiaries (Black & Blinder 1986). 
3
 The theory that expectation formed on the basis of experience determines the work type of 
individuals. 
4
The theory that deviant culture, pessimistic view of life, dependent habit, inferiority 
complex, fatalism, etc. which are observed by the poor are main factors which interfere the 
employment of beneficiaries and widely poor people(Banfield 1968, Rosenbaum &Popkin 
1991). However, the theory of poverty culture was blamed by empirical analyses showing 
that deviant culture is not a cause of poverty but a result of it(Valentine 1968, Beeghley 1983, 




and Working Tax Credit (WTC) of U. K. The EITC and the WTC are income 
security models that the governments pay in cash to the workers earning below a 
certain level in accordance with the prescribed standard through the tax system (Lee, 
2002). Third, the active labor market policy attempted in Europe is to prevent or 
eliminate unemployment and to promote create job opportunities and promote 
employment directly or indirectly through the control and involvement of the 
government for the balanced demand and supply of manpower.  
This is the policy of the national basic livelihood security system 
commenced in October, 2000 as a type of self-sufficiency program. In such a way, 
many countries have been making efforts for work incentive policies, and South 
Korea adopted this through the NBLSS which started as a self-support program in 
October, 2000. Today, 13 years after the NBLSS was introduced, it is settled as the 
basis of poverty policy, and is being positioned as a critical social security system 
through which the minimum living standard is guaranteed by the government. This 
has been implemented with improvement of many times through positive 
participation and discussion of the concerned authority, academic society and civic 
groups. 
At every time of improvement of this system, diagnosis and evaluation on it 
has been made in diverse aspects. Especially, due to the self-support program which 
is the most remarkable characteristic of this system, work incentive of workable 




according to the type of beneficiaries has been argued. Since the graded benefit 
scheme for special beneficiaries will be adopted in 2014, the importance of work 
incentive according to the types of beneficiary will be an issue also. 
 On May 14, 2013, Prime Minister Hong Won Jung and the concerned 
ministers agreed to change the welfare paradigm from the existing benefit providing 
system which was an integrated benefit system as „customized employment/welfare‟ 
to the welfare system of paying the benefits by different levels after selecting the 
beneficiaries for special benefits (residence, healthcare and education) by steps in 
October, 2014. This will be much helpful not only for the welfare of people in 
unprivileged condition of welfare but also for special beneficiaries who are main 
targets, and it is expected that this will influence inducing the normal beneficiaries 
of the NBLSS excluding a certain period of time and a certain group (special 
beneficiaries).  
The reason why work incentive of such two groups is that the group of 
special beneficiaries who receive applicable special benefits (residence, healthcare, 
education, self-support, etc.) may have less work incentive than regular 
beneficiaries who receive living benefits.  If this assumption is true, the new 
benefit system to be implemented from 2014 may result in declining the work 
incentive, which will led to failure to achieve the goal to guide self-support and will 
increase the dependence on welfare, although it will guarantee the minimum living 





Therefore, this study is intended to research how to induce those special 
beneficiaries to work. This is significant because the effect on future change of the 












































1. Background of the NBLSS  
 
 
When the financial crisis of Korea under IMF control brought up unprecedented 
mass unemployment and a poor class problem came to the fore newly in 1997, the 
Korean government realized the limitation of the Livelihood Protection Program 
that already existed. Thereafter, there has been needed to make the policy to cover 
total poverty countermeasure with productive welfare that promotes self-reliance of 
beneficiaries with civic organizations headed by a social consensus of society. The 
Korean government increased social assistance programs for the poor who have 
work ability on the basis of notion of productive welfare. The National Basic 
Livelihood Security Act introduced in 1999 incorporated an active labor market 
component into its social assistance programs and established the basic minimum 
livelihood benefit.  
 The Livelihood Protection Program (LPP), which was established by the 
military regime in 1961, caused social problems for poor people having work ability 
to be left in blind spot such as suicide, break down of family, becoming homeless 
etc. because the LPP focuses on the elder and the disabled who have incapacity of 




Livelihood Security System Process Enactment Regiments Council‟, and on 7
th
 of 
September in 1999, the legislation has been enacted to be enforced on 1
st





2. Five Distinctive Characteristics between the LPP and the 
NBLSS 
 
The earlier welfare system called „Livelihood Protection program (LPP)‟ and the 
later system „National basic Livelihood Security System (NBLSS)‟ have five 
differences between them. It replaced the LPP of 1961 which was aimed at 
providing minimal income maintenance for the „deserving poor‟. The NBLSS 
solved the problem of the previous program LPP of providing livelihood benefits to 
the people having work ability.  <Table1> shows the standard of determining the 
household who has less income level than the minimum living expenses, which has 
changed from various standards to one actual standard as the Minister of the 










<Table 1> the Distinctive Features of the LPP and the NBLSS 
Division The Livelihood Protection 
Program 
The National Basic Livelihood 
Security System 
Coverage Deserving poor 
-Age exclusion (18-64) for 
cash benefit 
-Only for those without ability 
to work 
-Abandon age category 
-All eligible, regardless of ability 
to work 
Means test -Income limit and asset limit 
(measured separately) 
-Combined measurement  
(under the recognized amount of 
income criteria) 
Benefit level Basic sustenance level, which 
was unrealistically low 
Benefits more generous; new 
housing and welfare-to-work 
benefits 
Benefit method Flat-rate Supplementary 
Poverty line Dependent on available 
budget 
Minimum cost of living 
(Source: The National Basic Livelihood Security System Monitoring andEvaluating, 
2009) 
  
 Calculation in the means test was mitigated from the calculation of each 
income limit and asset limit to the calculation by one measurement under the 
approved income criterion.  The changed benefit level and method make these two 
systems distinctive. The flat-rate method that covers the basic sustenance level only 
was changed to the supplementary method that covers new housing and welfare-to-
work benefits also. In addition, the NBLSS is emphasized in the production side of 
public assistance as it is involved in the self-support program for the people having 
work ability.  




only, was abandoned, and the NBLSS extended the coverage to all needy citizens, 
regardless of their work ability. Thus, under the NBLSS, the able-bodies, 
unemployed poor, have become eligible for social assistance benefits. The NBLSS 
also abolished the eligibility of the age categories in the previous scheme which had 
excluded those between 18 and 64 from receiving cash benefits.  
 Second, the Nation Basic Livelihood Security System redefined the official 
poverty line
5
 in terms of the minimum living cost. Many countries and institutions 
defined the poverty line in various ways. See below <Table 2>. The major 
institutions or countries chose to define the poverty line as relative approach.  
 
<Table 2> Relative Poverty Line of Major Institutions or Countries 
Major Institutions / 
Countries 
Criteria for Relative Poverty Line 
OECD 40%, 50%, or 60% of the median income 
World Bank For developing countries,1/3 of the average income; 
for advanced countries,1/2 of the average income 
Great Britain 50% of the average income 
France 50% of the median income 
Japan 68% of the average expenditure 
 
                                           
5
 To define poverty line, there are two major ways: The first is Absolute Poverty Thresholds 
and the second is Relative Poverty Thresholds. As explained by the National Academy of 
Sciences panel, "Absolute thresholds are fixed at a point of time and updated solely for price 
changes.... In contrast, relative thresholds, as commonly defined, are developed by reference 
to the actual expenditures (or income) of the population." See Citro and Michael, eds., 





In this study, the poverty line was defined as Relative Poverty line as the 
minimum living cost determined on the basis of the households below a certain 
percentage of the average (or median) earnings (or expenditures) that are deemed 
unable for people to enjoy the standard level of living that the majority of society 
generally enjoy. The Relative Poverty line is the easiest way to measure poverty and 
is used by advanced nations that have eradicated absolute poverty to some degree. 
However, it leaves an open question as to which level should be set for the 
minimum living cost on the basis of which criteria. The NBLSS turned out to be 
more inclusive and more tolerant than the earlier LPP‟s guidelines.  
As afore-mentioned, the minimum living cost is measured by The Market 
Basket Approach, which is used to estimate a realistic, subsistence level of living. 
This Approach is also called as Rowntree‟s approach, which is a way of determining 
the minimum living cost by identifying the minimum level of all necessities 
required for subsistence and by converting it into a monetary value (Price x 
Minimum consumption quantity). Market Basket Approach is useful for calculating 
the basic amount of each type of supplementary benefits such as medical benefits or 
educational benefits and for determining the criteria for provision of additional 




however, this Approach also has a risk of subjective judgment by a researcher in 





















2000 324,011 536,614 738,076 928,398 1,055,588 1,191,134 3.0% 
2001 333,731 552,712 760,218 956,250 1,087,256 1,226,868 3.0% 
2002 345,412 572,058 786,827 989,719 1,125,311 1,269,809 3.5% 
2003 355,774 589,219 810,431 1,019,411 1,159,070 1,307,904 3.0% 
2004 368,226 609,842 838,797 1,055,090 1,199,637 1,353,680 3.5% 
2005 401,466 668,504 907,929 1,136,332 1,302,918 1,477,800 7.15% 
2006 418,309 700,489 939,314 1,170,422 1,353,242 1,542,382 3.0% 
2007 435,921 734,412 972,866 1,205,535 1,405,412 1,609,630 3.0% 
2008 463,047 784,319 1,026,603 1,265,848 1,487,878 1,712,186 5.0% 
                                           
6
 To measure the minimum living cost, there is another approach that is the Food Basket 
Approach so call Engel, Orshansky Approach. This approach is a way of determining the 
minimum living cost by identifying the minimum food cost and multiplying it by the inverse 
of the Engel ś coefficient (food cost/total income).This approach is easier to apply and better 
minimizes the subjectivity of researchers than the market basket approach. However, 
subjectivity may still occur in setting the minimum living standard to determine the Engel ś 
coefficient, and this approach renders measurement of the minimum living cost for 



















2009 490,845 835,763 1,081,186 1,326,609 1,572,031 1,817,454 4.8% 
2010 504,344 858,747 1,110,919 1,363,091 1,615,263 1,867,435 2.75% 
2011 532,583 906,830 1,173,121 1,439,413 1,705,704 1,971,995 5.6% 
2012 553,354 942,197 1,218,873 1,495,550 1,772,227 2,048,904 3.9% 
2013 572,168 974,231 1,260,315 1,546,399 1,832,482 2,118,566 3.4% 
(Source: Ministry of Health and Welfare-4 people standard) 
<Table 3> shows the official poverty line in Korea.  The rate of the 
poverty line has increased 3.9% on the average since 2000. The minimum living 
cost has become the official poverty guideline in determining the eligibility for 
NBLSS benefits. Under the previous scheme, the Korean government adjusted 
poverty guidelines according to the available portion of the annual budget at their 
discretion. The NBLSS introduced a scientific and realistic poverty guideline 
reflecting the minimum living cost which is the benefit amount to meet either an 
individuals‟ or a family‟s basic needs. 
 Third, a new means test method was adopted by the NBLSS which 
replaced the previous means test by which individual income and household assets 




introduced a measurement tool known as the „approved income criteria‟, which 
combined income and assets into one estimated household income by converting 
household assets and property into the income flow. Calculation of the approved 
income which is explained in more details late in the „Eligibility based on the 
Approved Income Criteria‟ part is explained in the part „The Eligibility Criteria for 
Beneficiaries‟. The criteria for the minimum living cost and the person under 
obligation to support must satisfy the conditions provided by this system. For 
example, in 1999, the means test guidelines under the LPP set the monthly income 
threshold as 230 thousand Korean won per person, and the overall assets threshold 
as 29 million Korean won per household to be eligible for LPP benefits. However, 
in 2000, under the NBLSS, all people whose estimated monthly household income 
fell below the minimum living cost of (KRW928,398 for a family of 4 members) as 
measured according to the „approved income criteria‟ were eligible for the NBLSS 
benefits. At first, the monthly household income of applicants should not exceed 
„the minimum living cost‟ line that the Minister of the Ministry of Health and 
Welfare announced every year. The income, when it is used in this system, means 
the „approved income‟ plus converted amount of property income into the assessed 
income, and minus the amount deducted.  
 Fourth, housing and welfare-to-work benefits were introduced. Housing 
benefits are provided to cover the rent and maintenance expenses to provide 
stability for low-income people. The welfare-to-work benefit is provided to those 




described later, the NBLSS beneficiaries able to work are often called „conditional 
beneficiaries‟ who need to participate in various self-support programs as a 
condition for receiving cash benefit provided in the form of welfare-to-work 
benefits.  
 Finally, unlike the LPP which provided flat-rate benefits, the NBLSS 
provides graduated benefits to ensure that beneficiaries reach the basic income 
guaranteed by the government. However, the NBLSS benefit structure does not 
allow an incremental phase-out of benefits once this amount is exceeded through 
additional income. Instead, all the benefits are removed at once as soon as 




3. Characteristic of the NBLSS  
 
The National Basic Livelihood Security System is a public assistance system, and it 
has three characteristics. First, it is a welfare system. The system‟s finance is not 
made from contribution such insurance premium, but the government covers all the 
expenses with general taxes. Second, it is a residual welfare provision system that 
selects the beneficiaries strictly through means test. Last, it is a welfare system that 
requires prior self-seeking efforts on the poor strata to appeal help at the last 
moment. At this point, the NBLSS is called as the last social safety net that the poor 




 On the basis of the notion of productive welfare, the government 
introduced major reforms to the country‟s social security system in 2000 as it said 
above. One of these reforms made to the social insurance system. First, the social 
insurance system has become more integrated and efficient through administrative 
improvements. Second, the coverage under the social insurance programs was 
expanded to include the vast majority of people. However, the most distinctive 





4. Key Contents of the NBLSS 
 
 
The social security system under the Social Security Act of Korea is composed of 5 
social insurances, public assistance and social welfare service.  Out of them, public 
assistance is provided mainly by the NBLSS, and additionally by healthcare 
benefits, patriots & veterans benefits, disaster relief benefit, etc. (Kim, et at., 2010). 
As it is known, the purpose of this system is to guarantee the minimum level of 




1) Principles of Benefits 




special system of guaranteeing the benefit for individual unit (healthcare, residence, 
education, self-sufficiency, etc.) is set up additionally. The seven principles of 
benefits under this system are the minimum livelihood security, supplementary 
benefits, support for independence, individuality, family support priority, other 
benefit priority, and universality. 
 
 
2) Types of Benefits 
There are eight types of benefits covering livelihood, residence, healthcare, 
education, birth giving, funeral and memorial service, self-sufficiency, and 
emergency support; and benefits for healthcare and emergency support are 
separately prescribed in accordance with the respective benefit law. 
 
 
3) The Eligibility Criteria 
Pursuant to Article 5-1 of the same law, the beneficiaries who have no person under 
obligation to support, have a person having no ability of supporting, or could not be 
supported, and whose admitted income is below the minimum level of livelihood 
are eligible for benefits. In other words, it is prescribed that one is considered as a 
beneficiary when he or she satisfies both standards of admitted income and a person 
under obligation to support, and exceptionally when the Minister of Healthcare and 
Welfare determines that he or she needs to be paid a part of or total of benefits as 





 From the year 2003, the eligibility criteria for beneficiaries have changed 
to the approved income and a person under obligation to support. The eligibility 
criteria for beneficiaries have been made on the basis of only two factors that are the 
approved income and a person under obligation to support. It used to be based on 
the assessed income, the assessed property, and a person under obligation to support, 
which were more rigid than the current criteria. 
 
<Table 4> Changed the Eligibility Criteria for Beneficiaries 
 
Criteria before changed (up to 2002) Criteria after changed (Starting 2003) 
Assessed income Assessed income 
Approved 
income Property Physical property  
(house, farm, car) 
Converted property income 
(Physical property factor 
eliminated) 





(Source: Ministry Health & Welfare) 
 
  
<Table 4> shows details about the criteria for eligibility to be a beneficiary.  
Assessed income is the only one not changed from the former system, and it is left 
as the „approved income‟ in the current criteria to combine with converted property 
income. Nevertheless, another criterion, a person under obligation to support has 




changed from the people having ability to support his/her second lineal relative such 
as grandparents, parents, son, daughter, and grandchildren to those having ability to 
support his/her first lineal relatives such parents, sons, sons-in-law, daughter and 
daughter-in-law as lenient to have the benefit. 
 
 
(1) Approved income Criteria (Standard: Year of 2012) 
 
The approved income was separate in each of the income basis and property basis 
until the year 2002. However, from the year 2003, the beneficiaries and the standard 
of wage can be decided by the approved income that calculated for each household, 
and it is compared with each minimum living cost per household provided by the 
Minister of Justice in Chapter 5 of the National Basic Livelihood Security System 
ACT. The approved income is the sum of assessed income and the converted 
amount of property income. At this point, the assessed income is calculated by 
subtracting the expenses from the actual income according to the household 
characteristics and subtracting the amount of deduction from earned income. The 
converted property income is obtained by subtracting the fundamental value of 
property from property amount and subtracting the liabilities, at the rate of multiple 
income conversion. 
 To get benefits from this system, the criteria for approved income criteria 




household‟s monthly income should not exceed the minimum living cost which is 
announced by the Minister of the Ministry of Health and Welfare every year. 
 
<Table 5> Calculate approved income (Standard: Year of 2012) 
 
Approved income = Assessed income + Converted amount of property income 
- Assessed income= (Actual income - Expenses based on household 
characteristics - Earned income deduction) 
- Converted property income- ((Property - Fundamental value of property - 
Liabilities) X (Income conversion rate)) 
(Source: Ministry Health & Welfare) 
 
 
 The income mentioned in this system means the „approved income‟ which 
is the sum of assessed income and converted amount of property income. The 
assessed income is calculated by subtracting the expenses according to the 
household characteristics from actual income and subtracting the amount of 
deduction from earned income. The converted property income is obtained by 
subtracting the fundamental value of property from property amount and subtracting 






(2) Person under Obligation to Support Criteria (Standard: Year of 2012) 
A beneficiary should have no person under obligation to support
7
. Although a 
person under obligation to support exists, he/she should be unable to render support; 
or a beneficiary should be unable to be supported. 
 
 
<Table 6 > Division of Person under Obligation to Support 
 
A person under 
obligation to 
support 
Ability to render support 
Criteria for a person under 
obligation to support 
None  - 
Meet criteria for a person 
under obligation to support  
Where a person 
under obligation 
to support exists 
Unable to render support 
Criteria for persons under 
obligation to support [○] 
Scarcely able to render support 
Criteria for persons under 
obligation to support [△] 
(Selected under assumption 
that sustenance allowances 
are provided) 
                                           
7
 Scope of „person under obligation to support‟ is a person with first lineal relations with a 






Able to render support 
(impossible to support; evasion 
of responsibility to support, etc.) 
Criteria for persons under 
obligation to support [○] 
Able to render support 
(providing support) 
Criteria for persons under 
obligation to support [X] 
(Source: Ministry Health & Welfare) 
  
 
 Pursuant to Articles 4 and 5 of the same law and its enforcement order, 
each of the following cases will be considered as a beneficiary who satisfies the 
standard of a person under obligation to support. 
 
- In case that a beneficiary has no person under obligation to support; 
- In case that a beneficiary has a person under obligation to support but 
without ability of supporting; 
- In case that a beneficiary has a person under obligation to support but 
considered as having no ability in terms of supporting the beneficiary; or 
- In case that a beneficiary could not be supported by a person under 












(Source: Ministry Health & Welfare) 
 
※ The special case for property criteria is only applied to the cases where the 
household of a person under obligation to support does not have a household 
member who is able to work; or the only property is a house. 
※ (Special cases for property criteria for a person under obligation to support) 
  
 The above figure shows the basic principles of determining the possibility 
to be supported. The income of a person under obligation to support without such 
ability should be less than 130% of the minimum livelihood expenses per household, 
and his converted amount of property income should be less than 43% of the sum of 
respective minimum livelihood expenses of beneficiary and such person under 
obligation to support. In addition, in the criterion of lacking ability of support, the 
income of the person under obligation to support should be more than 130% of the 




of the sum of respective minimum livelihood expenses of the household of 
beneficiary and that of the person under obligation to support, and such person‟s 
converted amount of property income should be less than 42% of the sum of 
respective minimum livelihood expenses of beneficiary and the person under 
obligation to support. 
 
 
(3) Special Criteria for Beneficiary (Standard: Year of 2012) 
① Special Application of Property Coverage 
 
In converting the income, a household composed of non-workable people only such 
as elderly person, serious handicapped person, etc. is excluded from conversion into 
income (i) if their property value is less than 850 million won in a major city, less 
than 650 million won in a small or medium city, or less than 600 million won in a 
rural area, (ii) if the financial asset is the basic property value in each region; and 
(iii) if they have no automobile of which rate of converting into income is 100%. 
Furthermore, a household whose property is difficult to be converted into income 
due to trouble of disposing the property is excluded from conversion into income if 
their property value, etc. is in the afore-mentioned range.
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② Medical Benefits 
 
The second type of special cases is for medical benefits. If the medical expenses 
incurred continuously for more than six months are deducted from the approved 
income, the household shout meet the criteria beneficiary designation; however, 
since the household was selected as a beneficiary, the medical expenses subject to 
deduction have not incurred any more so that the household is beyond the criteria in 
the approved income. In such case, medical benefits are only paid to the individual 
household member who needs continuous funding for medical expenses. 
③ Education Benefits 
 
The third type of special cases is for education benefits. If the education expenses 
for middle and high school students (e.g. admission fee, tuition fee) are deducted 
from the approved income, the household should meet the criteria for beneficiary 
designation; however, since the household was designated as a beneficiary, the 
education expenses subject to deduction have not incurred so that the household is 
beyond the criteria in the approved income. In such case, education benefits are paid 
to the individual student concerned. 
④ Self-Sufficiency Benefits  
 
The self-support benefit is the fourth type of a special case. If an applicant ś 
approved income exceeds the criteria designation as a beneficiary due to his/her 
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income increased by his/her participation in self-support programs such as self-
support work, self-support community, or self-support program, the self-support 
benefits continue to be paid to the individual concerned so that he/she can continue 
to participate in such self-support program. (Payment of livelihood/housing benefits 
discontinues.) 
⑤ Transition Benefits 
 
The fifth type of the special cases is for transition benefits. If an applicant‟s 
approved income exceeds the criteria to be designated as a beneficiary due to 
his/her earned income or business income when he/she has the Hope Growing 
Accounts (Individual Development Accounts, IDAs) or participates in Integral job-
seeking support system for low-income group (MOEL) or Hope Re-born Project, 
the transition benefits (medical and education benefits for two years) are paid to 
each household. 
 The scope of eligible beneficiaries for special benefits is based on the 
person(s) under obligation to support, and eligible beneficiaries under property 
criteria are also based on the person under obligation to support. Regarding the 
criteria for a person under obligation to support for special cases of medical benefits, 
see the guideline on the criteria for calculation of the approved income and 







5. Welfare-to-Work of the NBLSS 
 
In 2000, the forty-year-old Livelihood Protection Program (LPP) was replaced with 
the National Basic Livelihood Security System (NBLSS). The new scheme was 
implemented to provide eligible low incomers with subsidies and to ensure that they 
achieve a minimum standard of living regardless of work ability. The age was 
excluded and the work ability requirement of the old Livelihood Protection Program 
(LPP) was abolished; moreover, the notion of the Poor Law of serving only the 
„deserving poor‟ was abandoned.   
 As noted in the introduction part, one of the most important features of the 
new social assistance scheme is the self-support program, which is Korea‟s unique 
welfare-to-work program. It is designed to enhance the capacity of social assistance 
beneficiaries to achieve self-support through participation in labor market. In this 
regard, the self-support program is widely acknowledged as a key element in 
Korea‟s productive welfare model. Beneficiaries of social assistance benefits, who 
are able to participate in welfare-to-work activities, are referred to local self-support 
agencies where they receive training and job placement. These self-support agencies 
are non-profit organizations who are contracted with the government. In addition, 
they may be referred to a local municipal government to be placed in a public 
workfare type program. A unique feature of the self-support agencies is that they 
target those clients seeking for employment in the open job market or otherwise 
wishing to establish their own businesses. They also provide marketable job training 
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and education opportunities 
 
 
<Figure 2> Minimum income line-Poverty Line 
(Source: The Bank of Korea) 
  
 Self-support agency clients receive social assistance benefits from the 
NBLSS while they are in the welfare-to-work program. However, once they find a 
stable source of income from regular employment or participation in cooperative 
micro-enterprises, they are no longer to receive cash benefits. They are provided 
their work as limited; just not to fall below the poverty line. (See <Figure 2.> In this 
case, the scheme provides supplementary benefits to ensure that they reach the 
minimum income guaranteed by the government. However, it is hoped that clients 
having participated in the welfare-to-work program will attain self-support and 
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6. The NBLSS Procedures  
 
An application, which applicants submit for the benefits,
8
will automatically go 
through several examinations
9
and once he/she passed the examinations, they 
become a beneficiary of benefits
10
 and get paid
11
 the benefit that they have applied. 
The beneficiary must verify
12
his/her eligibility for the benefits, and if the 
                                           
8
 A beneficiary, his/her relative or any other authorized person, or a public official in charge 
of social welfare by virtue of his/her authority applies for benefits to the Eup/Myeon/Dong 
office with jurisdiction over the domicile of the beneficiary. (Public workers, etc. may apply 
for benefits for low-income households.) 
Required documents are an application form for benefits, a consent form for release of 
financial information, and other documents to prove income and property, etc. 
9
 First, it is to determine whether the applicants are in the scope of eligible households and 
persons under obligation to support. Second, it is to verify the official documents, such 
financial assets through income/property declaration data and the Happiness E-
eum(integrated computerized database for social welfare administration). Third, it is to 
examine the actual living conditions of beneficiaries; and the income of beneficiaries whose 
official documents were not examined should be additionally verified according to their 
actual expenditure table. Forth, it is to determine the beneficiary‟s´ work ability in reference 
to the characteristics of their household, disability, or medical certificates according to the 
work ability determination process. 
10
 Eligibility and details of benefit payment are determined on the basis of the results of 
examination. 
 -Notification on the details of decision. (via e-mail, SMS, or documentation) 
 -If one intends to raise an objection to a decision, he/she may file a formal objection within 
60 days from receipt of the notice. 
11
 -Decided benefits are paid to a household or a person designated as a beneficiary. 
-Types of benefits: Livelihood benefits, housing benefits, education benefits, childbirth  
benefits, funeral benefits, and medical benefits 
  -Livelihood benefits and housing benefits are paid in cash; and other benefits are paid in-
kind. 
12
 -Any modification to official data is examined through the Happiness E-eum (integrated   
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verification reveals to be false, the beneficiary is no longer eligible. If it is found 
that his or her eligibility for benefits is obtained through a fraud, he/she will be 
imposed on penalties in accordance with the criteria for collection of the assistance 





















                                                                                                            
  computerized database for social welfare administration) on a regular basis. 
-For a beneficiary not subject to official documentation requirements, the inquiry for  
verification will be carried out in accordance with annual plans of each administrative unit 
of Si/Gun/Gu. 
 -Decision on change in or discontinuation of benefits is made if modifications need to be  











1. Theoretical Discussion  
 
 
The effects of the NBLSS on labor supply have been discussed among people in 
relation to the benefit system.  A number of researchers affirm that some 
beneficiaries under the NBLSS avoid working or provide the minimal work to 
maintain the status as a beneficiary (Moffit, 1983; Yoo & Kim, 2002; Lee, 2004; 
Kang, 2004; Kim, 2004, Koo, 2005; Park, 2005; Kim, 2008). For example, it has 
been pointed that the monetary work incentive under the NBLSS, including the 
integrated benefit system under which the criteria for cash benefit of the 
supplementary benefit system is connected to the benefit in cash and the benefit in 
kind, becomes a critical obstacle for work activities and participation in self-support 
of workable beneficiaries, or efforts to escape from benefits (Koo, 2005). 
 The rules of the supplementary benefits are prescribed in Article 3-1 of the 
National Basic Livelihood Security Act as follows: 
  
 “The benefits pursuant to this Act will be, in principle, supplemented and 
 developed, provided that a beneficiary makes utmost efforts to maintain 
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 and improve his or her own life by utilizing own income, property, work 
 ability, etc.” (Article 3-1 of the National Basic Livelihood Security Act)  
 
 Under the system in which the sum of the approved income of a 
beneficiary and the 4 basic benefits for livelihood, residence, healthcare and 
education exceeds the minimum living expenses, the difference of the minimum 
living expenses per household from the approved income is paid; therefore, a 
household having higher approved income receives less benefits that much. 
Accordingly, the rule of supplementary benefit brings about the increase of non-
labor income, so such an effect of income tends to hinder the beneficiaries under the 
public assistance policy from participating in economic activities (Thomas et. al., 
2012). At present, the benefits under the NBLSS are provided as an integrated 
benefit system. A household of which approved income is less than the minimum 
living expenses for the number of its members is designated as a household 
beneficiary.  In such a case, the household gets eligible for the 7 major benefits for 
livelihood, residence, healthcare, education, self-support, etc. (See Chapter 2). 
 This integrated benefit system is connected to the criteria of eligibility for 
benefits in cash or in kind. It means a „all or nothing‟ system because one loses his 
or her eligibility for benefits in cash, he or she becomes to lose the eligibility for 
benefits in kind also. Thus, under the current integrated benefit system, people in 
poverty as non-beneficiaries, and next upper class having specific needs such as 
residence, healthcare, education, etc., who are eligible for special benefits, could not 
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receive any benefit, so there may be a wide range of dead angle (Yoon, 2007). 
Therefore, in October, 2014, a „special benefit welfare system‟ in which different 
levels of individual needs are applied will be launched for the people in the dead 
angle, who are eligible for special benefits (See the figure below). 
 
 
<Figure 3> Changes the NBLSS Wage System Conceptual Diagram 
(Source: Ministry Health & Welfare) 
 
 The „all or nothing‟ benefit system under the current NBLSS based on the 
approved income by combining the integrated benefit system and the supplementary 
benefit system can provide the beneficiary with the incentive to decrease labor 
supply or hide economic activities or earned income in order to maintain the 
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eligibility for benefits rather than escape from poverty through labor. In other words, 
if one‟s approved income exceeds the minimum living expenses, he or she loses the 
eligibility for livelihood benefit and the eligibility for all other major benefits for 
healthcare, education, residence, self-support, etc., so eventually his or her actual 
income becomes much lower than that before his or her escape from the benefits. 
Therefore, there may be a phenomenon that beneficiaries under the NBLSS try to 
decrease labor at a certain point of earned income increased, so that their earned 
income may not exceed the criteria of eligibility for benefits (Moffitt, 2002).  
 In this study, it is intended to verify if this theory is also applied to the 
special beneficiaries receiving more benefits because of being applicable to special 
benefits. Moreover, the benefit scheme under the NBLSS operated by combing the 
supplementary benefit system and the integrated benefit system guarantees the 
minimal income of beneficiaries; therefore, it is not helpful for them to escape from 
benefits, and rather discourages their incentive to escape from benefits.  It means 
that the benefit providing under the NBLSS results in suppressing the will for labor 
although it is a reasonable choice made by considering the benefit amount and the 
advantages of beneficiaries. 
 
 
1) Work Incentive 
 
Work incentive has been one of the inevitable tasks in public assistance since the 
Speenhamland system started to protect workable workers in 1795. Most of 
advanced countries of capitalism secure a certain level of working poor‟s life with 
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public assistance or similar public assistance programs of securing the income. On 
this spot, beneficiaries of public assistance choose not to work, which is a rational 
choice to enhance their utility. However, if the security level is low, beneficiaries 
become to work because generally leisure is normal goods.  
 On the other hand, if beneficiaries work in a national basic livelihood 
protection program (supplementary benefit) that do not have a work incentive 
system, total amount of earned income decreases due to the supplementary benefit. 
Eventually, in case of the workable beneficiaries for public assistance, they have 
weaker work incentive from both negative (-) income effect and substitution effect 
of the pure national basic livelihood protection program (supplementary benefit). 
For this reason, the work incentive is a major goal of public assistance system.  
 Economic fluctuation model (Blank & Blinder, 1986), cultural poverty 
theory (Banfield,1968; Rosenbaum & Popkin, 1991; Spicker, 1993), and rational 
choice theory (Moffitt, 1992; Edin & Lein, 1997) are explained as the work 
incentive in the public assistance beneficiaries theories(Park, 2005), in other words 
labor supply. Among these, the theory of supporting the possibility of affecting the 
policy directly to strengthen work incentive is the rational choice theory. The 
rational choice model means that workers decide entry into labor market with 
working hours when the condition of utility is maximized to themselves through 
benefits or work so as to pay for the costs as unified concept of utility. If the benefit 
from origin status work is monetary compensation, the cost is loss of leisure. Thus, 
it is possible to reach a logical argument to strengthen beneficiaries‟ work incentive 
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by encouraging beneficiaries to work.  
 However, Ellwood (1994) points out that it is hard to understand the 
behaviors of beneficiaries in the viewpoint of reasonable choice because 
beneficiaries tend to have psychological disorder such as helplessness in the course 
of family dissolution and property ruin due to long life in poverty.  As afore-said, 
if benefit providing under the NBLSS is correlated to the tendency of work 
avoidance influencing the earned income and to unobserved variables such as 
psychological disorder, the variables of benefits under this system has endogeneity 
(Ahn, 2011). 
 A <Table 7> is the example of the work incentive. If you see employment 
rate of between capacity to work beneficiary household and capacity to work non-
beneficiary poor-household, the non-beneficiary‟s employment rate is doubled than 






















<Table 7> Comparative characteristic and work condition beneficiary-household 
and non-beneficiary-household 
 
(Source: Korea Institute for Health and Social Affairs. Seoul National University 
Social Welfare Research Center, Analysis the Korean Welfare Panel Study.Quote 
from „Basic Livelihood Security System Overall Evaluation‟) 
* Capacity to work beneficiary-household = CWRH 
* Capacity to work non-beneficiary poor-household = CWNP 
* Capacity to work non-poor-household = CWNH 
 
 As it is shown that innovation of the social security system strengthens the 
relationship with the labor market policy, western welfare countries have adopted 
the „work-related welfare policy aiming at promoting entry of beneficiaries with 
                                           
13
 Employment rate calculated as whole household-head against all income employees, 
employer, owner-operator, work as non-paid family business.  
14
 Work income calculated as add all work income, business income, and agriculture 
livestock · fishery income of household-head. 
Division CWRH CWNP CWNH 
Characteristic 
House-hold 
House members (person) 2.7 2.2 3.4 
Age of house-head (age) 48.8 46.1 44.5 
Female house-head percentage 
(%) 
41.0 38.4 9.5 
Percentage of under high-school 
graduate house-head (%) 






 36.6 65.2 94.1 
Work income (KRW/yr)
14
 569.5 836.1 3679.5 
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work ability into the labor market, and making them escape from poverty. Welfare 
innovationists point out the work disincentive of welfare system mentioning that 
welfare beneficiaries tend not to get a job but to keep their status of beneficiary 
because of no enough difference between the welfare benefit level of beneficiaries 
and the income level of low-incomers. They stay in the low-income status since 
they do not feel any necessity of extending working hours to increase their income 
in the situation of high marginal effective tax rate. It means that if the income 
earned by extended working hours is set off by a tax, low-incomers do not feel 
necessity to work harder, which makes them difficult to escape from poverty.   
 To eliminate such a pit of poverty, the tax system for low-income workers 
is required to be innovated. Prior to the study through literature, it is to review the 
effect of work incentive from this system. It is to compare the effect of reduced 
labor supply by supplementary benefit with the effect of work incentive from this 
system. The figure below shows the problems of this system, which have been 
argued up to date; those are supplementary benefit system and integrated benefit 
system. 
 Assuming that a person (p) is a beneficiary of the NBLSS, it can be 
observed if work incentive is motivated, which is the effect of reduced labor supply 
of the supplementary benefits, when income deduction is applied to the 
supplementary benefits of the person (p).  
 
 With leisure and consumption, if a person (p) maximizes utility, the 




  PC = N + W  T − L  
＊N: Nonwageincome, W: Wage rate per hour,  
P: Price of consumer goods, T: Total workable time 
 
 
Where, if T-L is converted into H, the person‟s utility function is as below:
   H = T − L 
 
Y in the following equation is income, which equals to the sum of 
nonwage income including the income by private transfer from 
acquaintances and the work income (WH). 
  Y = N + WH 
 
Due to the characteristics of supplementary benefits from public assistance, 
the livelihood benefits (B) which a person can receive is the balance that 
the nonwage income and the work income (WH) are subtracted from the 
minimum livelihood expenses (G).  
 
   B = G −  WH = N  
 
 
The more work the income (WH) of a person increases, the more the 
benefits (B) in cash decreases. 
 
 




<Figure 4> Reduce Effect on Work Supply of Supplementary Benefit  
 
(Source: Moffitt, 2002)  
 
 
 In the horizontal axis, the work time at the point showing the personal 
work time is zero (0); and when it goes to the left, the work time increases. The 
vertical axis shows the income; and AB section is the nonwage income which is the 
income for maintenance of livelihood even when the work time is 0.  BC section is 
B which is the benefit in cash received by a person. Accordingly, AC section is G 
which is G which is the minimum livelihood expenses. When the slope of the 
budget limit line BJ is –W, the slope of CE1 in AE0 section becomes 0(zero).  
 Thus, the higher income a person gets through more work in AE0 section, 
the less cash benefits he or she gets. In other words, at the point A where the work 
time is 0(zero), the benefit in cash received by a person becomes G-N, but at the 
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point A where the work income increased, it becomes G-YD1 which is less than that 
at the point A. 
 Theequation is expressed as below. 
  G-N > G-YD1 
 
 The above result of G-N > G-YD1 shows that it is common that nobody 
wants to increase the work time under the current system. It is being pointed that 
there is a problem of work incentive because the beneficiaries of the NBLSS of 
which purposes are to guarantee the minimum livelihood and to promote self-
support tend to avoid working to maintain the status of beneficiary or provide 
minimal labor to maintain the eligibility for benefits.   
 Actually, It has been argued that beneficiaries are getting more dependent 
on welfare not to escape from the status of beneficiary and their work incentive 
decline in the supplementary benefit system, under which if the approved income 
level is below the minimum livelihood expenses, the difference is paid, and the 
integrated (all or nothing) system, under which if one satisfies the conditions of 
eligibility for benefits, he is paid all of special benefits, but if he is disqualified, he 
is paid nothing, Also, low level of benefit and big blind spot decrease the work 










2. Literature Review 
 
 
 There are diverse studies on the NBLSS; however, this study focuses on 
the hypothesis that the NBLSS will discourage the work incentive of beneficiaries. 
Yoo & Kim (2002) presented a simple simulation of the path that the redistribution 
policy affects labor supply, and concluded that labor supply from beneficiary 
households decreases, on the basis of presumed flexibility of wage and income 
related to labor supply.  
 Kang (2004) presumed the effect of labor supply of workable people in 
relative poverty class between 15 years and 65 years, whose household income 
accounts for 60% of median income, referring to the datum of survey on the self-
support program for low-income class, which was conducted by Korea Institute for 
Health and Social Affair nationwide in 2002. As a result of analysis, it appeared that 
when the income from public transfer increased one million Korean won per annum, 
the labor hours of male householder and female householder decrease 81.6 hours 
(4.06%) and 16.6 hours (0.76%) respectively, and the flexibility of labor supply is 
very low compared to unearned income. The used datum was a transverse section 
datum containing only information of a certain time, it was not an analysis on the 
change of labor supply pattern, which appears in the same beneficiaries with 
changed basic security benefit level at time intervals, but an analysis by the 
comparison of the labor supply level of diverse classes on the basic security benefit 
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level at a certain time; therefore, there is a limit to directly relate the benefit level 
and the labor supply.  
 In the study of Lee (2004) where the datum of Korea Labor Panel was used, 
it was empirically analyzed through a difference-in-difference model by setting the 
low-educated people of workable households as the program group under direct 
influence of the NBLSS, and the members of non-workable households as the 
control group. The result of analysis showed that the NBLSS doesn‟t have a 
significant influence on employment and working hours according to statistics. 
There was no significant influence statistically because (i) the limitation is big in the 
property and the person under obligation to support which are the criteria for 
beneficiaries under the NBLSS of South Korea, and in discretional determination by 
social welfare workers; (ii) the NBLSS requires workable beneficiaries to do labor 
activities subject to conditional benefit regulations; and (iii) evaluation on the 
NBLSS in such study was made 2 years after it was launched, so it was too short to 
make changes in the policy. 
 With the data of survey by Korea Labor Panel, Byun (2005) analyzed the 
influence of the NBLSS on labor supply of workable people through a difference-
in-difference model of using the variables before and after its implementation. The 
result showed that the demand variable affects the economic activities of workable 
beneficiaries, together with the NBLSS and the supply variable of labor market. 
There was decrease of 1.5 hours in labor supply of low-educated workable 
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beneficiaries; however, there was no statistical significance in the model of gender 
and spouse.   
 This study is different from the study by Lee (2004), by analyzing the 
subject group with different models according to education level, gender, spouse, 
etc. with consideration of interaction term of group variable and time variable, and 
demand variables including unemployment rate by areas, average wage by jobs, etc. 
 In the study by Koo (2005), it appeared that employment of beneficiaries is 
possible to increase as a result of research on the employment rate under the 
NBLSS with participation in economic activity as a dependant variable. However, 
in the employment pattern, it was pointed out that unstable employment structure 
with the majority of temporary part-time workers possibly has a negative effect on 
labor hours. For this study, work incentive was analyzed indirectly by the use of the 
secondary statistical data published by the Ministry of Health and Welfare. 
 According to Kim (2008), the rate of participation by the group under the 
policy decreased 0.86% and the labor hours decreased 1.6 hours per week in 2004 
compared to those in 2003, which are not significant statistically; therefore, it 
should not be considered that the NBLSS has negative effects. In this study, with 
reference to Korea Labor Panel, difference-in-difference analysis was made with the 
subject group of householders under the NBLSS and the control group of non-
beneficiary householders, which was formed by the use of property score matching. 
 Park and Choi (2011), with reference to Korea Welfare Panel, divided the 
subjects into new beneficiary households and existing beneficiary households, and 
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examined the effects of the NBLSS on the earned income, income from private 
transfer, property income and household income of the beneficiaries under the 
NBLSS, by using the difference-in-difference analysis through property score 
matching. As a result of comparison of the years 2005 and 2007, new beneficiary 
households had an effect of decrease of 6.66 million Korean won in their labor.  
Existing beneficiary households had an effect of decrease of 3.02 million Korean 
won; however, the subjects analyzed were both of workable households and non-
workable households, and especially, a number of elders were included, so the 
negative labor effect of new beneficiary households was exaggerated. 
 As a result of having measured the effect of labor supply with the rate of 
participation in economic activities, employment rate, annual working days and 
earned income, Park and Kim (2011) found that the rate of participation in 
economic activities and the employment rate are lower in the beneficiary group than 
in the non-beneficiary group; also the working days and the earned income were 
less in the beneficiary group. For this study with reference to Korea Welfare Panel, 
difference-in-difference analysis through property score matching was used, in 
which the subject group was divided into the new beneficiary households and the 
existing beneficiary households. 
 Out of the precedent studies by Lee (2004); Byun (2005); Kim (2008); 
Park and Choi (2011); and Park and Kim (2011), there was no study on the 
comparison between the special beneficiary group and the regular beneficiary group 
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on the basis of work ability, educational background and gender when the control 
group was set. Especially, in the studies by Lee (2004) and Byun (2005), it is hard 
to estimate the effect of the NBLSS on labor supply because of failure to control the 
heterogeneity from the subject group.  Such a weak feasibility of cause-and-effect 
relation was verified through property score matching by which the control group 
similar to the subject group of actual beneficiaries could be formed. 
 However, with coming benefit system for special beneficiaries by levels, 
which will be introduced in 2014, it is intended in this study to analyze the work 
incentive related to work ability, which has been evaluated in various aspects with 
every attempt for system improvement, and the work incentive related to 
beneficiary type, which has never been discussed except for labor supply. Also, this 
study of using the transverse section data differently from the previous studies of 
having used longitudinal section data contains information at a certain time.  
However, this study is intended to verify the work incentive of beneficiaries of 
different benefit types (special & regular) at a certain time, with the concept that the 
work incentive pattern is more influenced by personal properties of each beneficiary 
rather than by continuously influenced by the NBLSS because the work incentive 
pattern of a subject beneficiary, which appear with the changes of benefit level with 













 The attempt to find any changes of work incentive of the two groups 
(special beneficiaries & regular beneficiaries) according to the benefit types of the 
NBLSS is to study and verify prior to the implementation of the „Special Benefit 
Welfare System‟ around October, 2014 if there is no problem in the benefit system 
under the NBLSS which is an integrated benefit system.  The hypotheses of this 
study in verifying it are as below: 
 
H1: Regular beneficiaries will have a negative influence on the work 
incentive than special beneficiaries will. 
 
 This is the concept that the benefit for special beneficiary group guarantees 
the plus amount to the benefit for regular beneficiary group, in which the possibility 
of their lower work incentive than that of the beneficiaries receiving the livelihood 
benefit only cannot be excluded. If the assumption that the work incentive of special 
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beneficiaries is lower than that of regular beneficiaries is true, the new benefit 
system to be effective in 2014 will lower the work incentive of special beneficiaries 
and guarantee the minimum livelihood which is the objective of the NBLSS, but 
will fail to lead self-support and increase the reliance on welfare benefits due to 
guarantee of the minimum livelihood; and eventually will be criticized again. 
Therefore, this study is to review the effect on the change of benefit system.    
 
 
2. Research Design 
 
2.1 Analysis Data and Study Object 
This study utilized the 7
th
 year edition of the Korea Welfare Panel in analyzing the 
beneficiaries of the NBLSS (National Basic Livelihood Security System), including 
both regular beneficiaries and special beneficiaries. The reason for using this data is 
that, above all, this survey data are based on all over the country. It means the data 
represents all the Koreans who get benefits from the system. Other data may include 
bias because of being directly surveyed with beneficiaries, and beneficiaries are 
sometimes a part of the subject groups.  
 Second, this survey of Korea Welfare Panel covers a bigger size of the 
beneficiaries group than that of the Korea Labor Panel.  Thus, this panel data are 
usually used as the representative in Korea. The reason if its bigger size is that it has 
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enlarged sampling of low-income group to find the needs for welfare and the 
conditions of low-income group. The welfare department should secure enough 
cases to analyze because they are not active in the NBLSS as known. Not only a 
number of cases or a bigger sample size, the Korea Welfare Panel but also has basic 
characteristic variables due to various questions in the questionnaire than in the 
Korea Labor Panel. It is possible to do an in-depth analysis of the NBLSS and 
welfare needs of respondents. Especially, it enables to utilize mental and emotional 
variables such as depression, self-esteem, and subjective view of welfare 
department. 
 Third, the Korea Welfare Panel researched with various variables are fully 
searched compared with medical provision data of National Health Insurance 
Service, which Kang used (Kang et al., 2006). However, it is impossible to do an in-
depth analysis, because of the characteristics of administrative data system; and 
other variables than basic demographical characteristics are not searched. As a 
result, this panel data is suitable for this study to find the effect of work incentive 









2.2 Analysis Model  
 









































































2.3 Define Variable  
2.3.1 Independent variable 
In considering this study, it may be useful to start out by examining how the 
independent variable provisions are subdivided into regular beneficiaries and 
special beneficiaries. Most researches are focused on their independent variables as 
workable beneficiaries or non-workable beneficiaries, newly provided benefits or 
continuously provided benefits, and simply provided benefits or not (Yoo & Kim, 
2000; Lee, 2004; Byun, 2005; Park & Choi, 2011; Park & Kim, 2011; Moffitt, 2002; 
Gary & Ryan, 2005). For the reason, this study was made by setting independent 
variables similarly to general category, but differently from specific category. For 
the sake of a new benefit provision scheme in the NBLSS, which will be enforced 
gradually from October, 2014, special beneficiaries are getting bigger portion.  
 However, none of studies has focused on special beneficiaries, so this 
study sets out to examine how to draw the work incentive of special beneficiaries. 
First, as afore-mentioned that the provisions were subdivided into regular 
beneficiaries and special beneficiaries, these two beneficiaries were measured in a 
scale of 1 to 5. The scale No. 1 means the case of having never received any benefit 
under the NBLSS, and No. 2 means the case of having received some benefit under 
the NBLSS continuously even before the year 2011 (the year 2011 belong to the 
period of time being under survey). The scale No. 3 is the case of having received 
some benefit under the NBLSS from the beginning to the end of the year 2011, 
which means the duration of having received some benefit is one year. The scale No. 
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4 is the case of having received before the year 2011, but not anymore, which 
means they have never received some benefit under the NBLSS. The last scale No. 
5 is the case of having received any before the year 2011, but not anymore, which 
means drop from the benefit in the NBLSS.  
 
<Table 8> the National Basic Livelihood Security System Frequency Analysis 
 
Division  Frequency Percent (%) 
0 (Null) 78 1.4 
1 5042 88.0 
2 554 9.7 
3 22 0.4 
4 35 0.6 
5 1 .0 
Total 5732 100.0 
(Standard on Dec. 31. 2011) 
  
 In summary, in <Table 8>, pertinent beneficiaries are shown in the scale 
Nos. 2 and 3. The total numbers of beneficiaries are 576, original non-receivers are 
5,042, and people who have dropped within 1year are 36, among the total number 
of 5,732. 
  
In <Table 9>, the subjects are classified into regular beneficiaries and 
special beneficiaries among the 576 NBLSS beneficiaries. Before the frequency 
analysis in <Table 9>, the subjects of Nos. 1 to 9 were divided into regular 
beneficiaries and special beneficiaries. The scale Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, and 9 are defined 
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as regular beneficiaries, which means 431 people are regular beneficiaries. Others 
of the scale Nos. from 5 to 8 are defined as special beneficiaries. Only 145 people 
among the total beneficiaries, being 25.2%, belong to special beneficiaries. 
 
<Table 9> Regular · Special BeneficiariesFrequency Analysis 
Division Frequency Percent (%) 
1 79 13.7 
2 220 38.2 
3 45 7.8 
4 79 13.7 
5 59 10.2 
6 5 0.9 
7 80 13.9 
8 1 0.2 
9 8 1.4 
Total 576 100.0 
(Standard on Dec. 31. 2011) 
 
 5,042 people do not receive any benefit from the NBLSS; in other words, 
88% of total have not received any benefit. Only 19.7% of the total are receiving or 
used to receive it. The sample size of an independent variable in this study is 576 
people (10.1% of total number). The total 576 people were subdivided into regular 
beneficiaries that are 431 people and special beneficiaries that are 145 people. This 
system‟s regular beneficiaries among the total beneficiaries account for 74.8% with 





2.3.2 Dependent variable 
 
In defining three variables that made conception of work incentive may be useful to 
begin with the suggestion about how dependent variables would work on this study. 
In this part, analysis on the frequency for dependent variables was made for 
conception of work incentive result in this study. In previous studies related to this 
study, dependent variables were set, such as economic activities status, working 
days, and earned income (Lee, 2004; Park & Kim, 2011; Byun, 2005, Park, 2005; 
Moffitt, 2002; Gary & Ryan, 2005). Park & Kim stated the status of economic 
activities including the employment rate, and even side-work activities. Considering 
the NBLSS beneficiaries are mostly elders together with the characteristics of 
households, they are rarely employed and most of them are temporary or daily-base 
workers or even side-workers who likely attempt to conceal their economic 
activities status or earn income, because they don‟t want to move to non-
beneficiaries status.  
 
 
2.3.2.1 Economic Activities (status) 
 
To carry on the above discussion here, one of the dependent variables is economic 
activity status which is measured with the nominal scale as "Yes, or No". In detail, 
the entry "Yes" restated a form with entry No. 1 to No. 6, where entry No. 1 is a 
regular worker, entry No. 2 is a temporal worker, entry No. 3 is daily-base worker, 
entry No. 4 is self-supporter, entry No. 5 is an employer, and entry No. 6 is an 
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owner. The others are defined as entry “No”, and those entries restated unpaid 
family worker as entry No. 7, the unemployed who try to get a job very strongly 
within last 4 weeks as entry No. 8, and no active population in economical aspects 
as entry No. 9.  
 
 
<Table 10> Economic Activities (status) Frequency Analysis   
Division Frequency Percent (%) 
0 (Null) 514 - 
3 44 71.0 
4 16 25.8 
9 2 3.2 
Total 62 100.0 
(Standard on Dec. 31. 2011) 
  
Since a missing divisions is more than half, <Table 11> has to be noted that several 
omitted divisions were not responded, being about 89.2% of the total number. In 
other words, here there is no regular workers, no temporal workers, no employers, 
no owners, no unpaid family workers, and no unemployed people according to the 
above entry numbers that were above-explained. People who have responded were 
only daily-base worker, self-supporter, and population without economic activities. 
Among those respondents, only 60 people were in economic activities. It is 86.8%. 
 
 
2.3.2.2 Monthly Working Days 
The dependent variables were subdivided into three variables among the variable 
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„work incentive‟. The second variable is working days measured on a monthly basis. 
Among the variable „monthly working days‟, the three entry variables were chosen: 
Entry „regular worker‟; entry „temporal worker and daily-base worker‟; and entry 
„employer and owner‟.  
 
<Table 11> Working Days Frequency Analysis 
Divisi
on  
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Tota
l 
F.1 568 - - - - - 1 - - - - - 7 576 
F.2 434 5 6 7 8 3 7 7 9 8 4 5 73 576 
F.3 4,971 1 - - - - 2 - - - 1 - 22 576 
Total - 6 6 7 8 3 10 7 9 8 5 5 102 576 
P.1 98.6 - - - - - 0.2 - - - - - 1.2 100 




P.3 95.5 0.2 - - - - - 0.3 - - - 0.2 3.8 100 
(Standard on Dec. 31. 2011) 
*F.1 (Frequency 1) = regular worker, F.2 (Frequency 2) = temporal worker · day-
worker, F.3 (Frequency 3) = employer · own 
 
 
 This study includes the variables as set at first, even though either 
employer or owner of beneficiaries was not found, and there is the characteristic of 
the NBLSS beneficiaries of changing answers. It is measured on a monthly basis as 
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noted earlier, which means the entry set as No. 1 to 12. It is very simple to set the 
divisions; for example, a beneficiary working for only one month is set as No. 1, No. 
2 for two months, No. 3 for three months, which goes on to twelve months. Again, 




2.3.2.3 Earned Income 
 
The last part of the dependent variables is „earned income‟ that is classified by 
Luxembourg Income Study (LIS), in which Yoo and Kim (2003) used the LIS 
method. Earned income, business & sideline income, and property income are all 
affiliated with the primary income, and addition income by private transfer becomes 
market income as seen below. Additionally, to calculate ordinary income, social 
insurance provision and public transfer income are added to the market income, and 





<Table 12> Income Classify 
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Public Pensions Social Security Expenses 
Social Insurance  
Taxes Income Taxes 








   




 The last variable among the dependent variables is earned income. 
According to the classification by the Luxembourg Income Study, this variable is 
calculated by adding the gross income of regular worker, temporal worker, and 
daily-base worker. The divisions in <Table 13> shows the range of variables from 
KRW 0 to KRW 55,485, and the unit of this variable is ten thousand Korean won 
(KRW 10,000). 
  
<Table 13> Earned Income Frequency Analysis 
Division Average Minimum Maximum Total 
Frequency 1 23.90 336 3,174 13,767 
Frequency 2 170.60 12 3,144 98,266 
Percent 1 - 0.2 0.2 100.0 
Percent 2 - 0.2 0.2 100.0 
(Standard on Dec. 31. 2011) 
  
 Moreover, the frequency 1 and 2 in the division section indicate regular 
worker and temporal, daily-base worker. The average indicates the number of 
people who are pertinent in each section of either regular worker, temporal worker, 
or daily-base worker. According to <Table 13>, regular workers take a much 
smaller portion than temporal or daily-base workers, but the minimum income of 
regular worker is much higher than other groups as expected. Ostensibly, temporal 
or daily-base worker seems to earn much income among the total number as shown 
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in <Table 13>, being. Yet, if we look into <Table 13>, the number of people as 
regular worker was much bigger than others. In other words, the NBLSS 
beneficiaries are more likely to be in temporal or daily-base worker condition. This 





The factors which can affect the work incentive are largely classified into socio-
demographic factors (gender, age, education, etc.) and human resource factors 
(work ability, health, etc.). In the case of gender, males generally have higher earned 
income and participation in economic activities. In this study, males are set as 1, and 
females as 2. Since there are many elders due to the characteristic of beneficiaries 
under the NBLSS, the age was set from 20 to 90.   
 In general, when the age increases, economic activities and earned income 
increase; however, if there are many elders, they may decrease. As for the marital 
status, people with spouse may have stronger work incentive because of 
responsibility for managing the home economy.   
 Single beneficiary is set as 0, and married beneficiary as 1. In the aspect of 
educational background, similarly to the age, beneficiaries with high educational 
background may have more active participation in economic activities and higher 
earned income, and there may be a high possibility of many beneficiaries with low 
educational background due to the characteristic of beneficiaries under this NBLSS, 
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although the result should be obtained.   
 Regarding the work ability, workable beneficiary was set as 1 and non-
workable beneficiary as 0 according to the index in Korea Welfare Panel.  With the 
assumption that healthier beneficiary would have higher work incentive, beneficiary 
having good health condition was set as 1 and beneficiary having bad health 















<Table14> Variables Measurement 








(13 scale measurement)    
0 ~ 12 = Never ~ 12 
Months 
Earned Income 
Regular workers + 
Temporal workers 
Independent Variable Beneficiaries 
Special Beneficiaries = 1 











Gender Male = 1, Female = 2 
Age 
Highest-1984=20 
1983-1974 = 30 
1973-1964 = 40 
1963-1954 = 50 
1953-1944 = 60 
1943-1934 = 70 
1933-1924 = 80 
1923-lowest = 90 
Marriage status Married = 1, Single = 0 
Education 
No education(1) =1 
Elementary(2,3) = 2  
Mid-high(4) = 3 
High(5) = 4 
Community college(6) = 
5 
College(7) ~ higher = 6 
Physical 
Factors 
Work capability Yes (1), No(0) 
Health condition 
(5 scale measurement) 
Very healthy = 1  
Healthy = 2  
Medium = 3  
Not healthy = 4  







<Table 15> Demographic Frequency Analysis 
 























Gender Male 266 46.2 





20-29 2 .3 
30-39 16 2.8 
40-49 75 13.0 
50-59 112 19.4 
60-69 99 17.2 
70-79 175 30.4 
80-89 82 14.2 
90-up 15 2.6 
Marriage Married 151 26.2 







Elementary 198 34.4 
Middle 98 17.0 
High 108 18.8 
Community 18 3.1 






Work 411 71.4 




Very healthy 13 2.3 
Healthy 119 20.7 
Medium 130 22.6 
Not Healthy 284 49.3 
Bad 30 5.2 







2.4 Analysis Methods  
 This study utilized year of 2012 Korean Welfare Panel Data as described 
above, and re-coding the data to analysis with multiple line regression, and logistic 





























Are special beneficiaries of the NBLSS are negative in work incentive than regular 
beneficiaries? Table 16, Table 17, and Table 18 show the results of analysis that 
special beneficiaries of the NBLSS are regressed (using both multiple regression 
and logistic regression) against several variables. The analysis presented in Table 16, 
Table 17, and Table 18 offers a preliminary understanding of the relationship 
between beneficiaries and work incentive (more details in Appendix).  
 
 
<Table 16> Special Beneficiarieseffect on Economic Activities (Status) 
 
 Dependent Variable 
Work Incentive 
Economic Activities (status) 











Gender .325 .339 .338 
Age -.060 .014 .000*** 
Marriage -.273 .369 .460 





-18.776 29997.929 .995 
Health 
condition 
-.062 .156 .692 
Constant 20.352 29997.929 .995 




 <Table 16> provides the results of hypothesis test that special beneficiaries 
are less likely to be in economic activities status than regular beneficiaries, and it 
offers a significant positive relationship between special beneficiaries and economic 
activities status as Beta: 0.441, sig.:0.102, and P < 0.1. Special beneficiaries are 
0.441 times more in economic activities status than regular beneficiaries at the 
slightly 90% confident level. In other words, special beneficiaries are probability to 
be in economic activities status 0.441 times higher than regular beneficiaries. As 
afore-said, the model also shows that younger special beneficiaries are 0.06 times 
more likely to be in economic activities status than older special beneficiaries. For 
example, special beneficiaries in 20‟s have 0.06 times of chance to be in economic 
activities status than special beneficiaries in 30‟s.  
 In this model, special beneficiaries have a higher possibility of doing 
economic activities than regular beneficiaries do, which is contrary to the 
hypothesis of this study. Especially, younger beneficiaries are more highly possible 
to do economic activities. Economic activity is one of the variables showing the 
work incentive, and it is interpreted that special beneficiaries have more positive 
influence on the work incentive than regular beneficiaries do. 
 
 <Table 17> shows the relationship between special beneficiaries and 
monthly working days. Special beneficiaries are more likely to increase their 
working days 0.966
15
 (almost one month) times more than regular beneficiaries as 
                                           
15
 A numeric 1.0 defined as a month, due to a unit of working day variable is set in month. 
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Beta: 0.966, sig.:0.015, and P < 0.05. It is clearly displayed in <Table 17> that the 
special beneficiaries are influenced by working days in a positive direction. In other 
words, when one unit of special beneficiaries increases, working days increase 
about a month at the same time, but working days for regular beneficiaries decrease. 
It is explained by adjusted R square 0.307 that estimated regression model data 30% 
(see Appendix for summary of model for such value of R2) with 90% confidence 
level. It is tentatively concluded that working days affect special beneficiaries to 
have more likely to receive benefits. 
 
<Table 17> Special Beneficiaries effect on Monthly Working Days 
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *P<0.1 
  
 From this result, male, younger, single, highly-educated, non-workable, 
unhealthy beneficiaries are more likely to increase the unit of their working days as 
well.  
 Dependent Variable 
Work Incentive 
Monthly Working Days 
B  β Sig 












Gender 1.402 .142 .001*** 
Age -.128 -.377 .000 
Marriage -1.648 -.147 .000 
Education .093 .024 .569 
Physical 
Factors 
Work Capability -1.831 -.168 .000 
Health condition -.974 -.185 .000 
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 To supplement this analysis, males are likely to increase his work more 
than females by 1.429 times per unit of increasing special beneficiaries, which 
means males likely increase working days of about 6 weeks more than females 
among the special beneficiaries as Beta: 1.429, sig.:0.001, and P < 0.01. However, 
older beneficiaries likely work about a week less than younger beneficiaries. For 
example, special beneficiaries in 30‟s are possible to work a week more than special 
beneficiaries in 20‟s. Additionally the variable „age‟ is the most highly effective 
variable on working days among five variables such as gender, age, marriage, work 
ability, and health condition. A single special beneficiary works 7 weeks more than 
married special beneficiaries as Beta: -1.648, sig.:0.000, and P < 0.01. The variable 
„marriage‟ is similarly effective on working day to the variable „gender‟. It means 
that the variable „gender‟ is least influential except the variable „education level‟ 
that was removed.  
 Curiously the result of work ability in working days appeared to be 
negative. In other words, the variable „work capability‟ appeared to less likely work 
about 8 weeks compared with special beneficiaries without work ability as Beta: -
1.831, sig.:0.000, and P < 0.01. It is explained by the provided benefit method 
schemes in the NBLSS that are supplementary benefit scheme and method of total 
payment. As mentioned above, these benefit provision methods was proved to 
reduce the work incentive of beneficiaries with work ability. 
 Work incentive decreased only in regular beneficiaries not in 
special beneficiaries because of the total payment method of provision benefit so-
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called „all or nothing‟. To receive special benefits, applicants also have to pass the 
general examinations under the NBLSS. As stated in the total payment method of 
benefit provision, beneficiaries have to keep their condition to be eligible to receive 
benefits by earning a certain amount of money, which shell not exceed the limit to 
be eligible. It is possibly explained that the benefit provision method has a tendency 
to make special beneficiary not  work more than certain days; in other words, the 
method tends to not to exceed a certain amount of income to keep his/her status for 
benefits in the NBLSS. It is not only applicable to special beneficiaries but also to 
regular beneficiaries. All beneficiaries concentrate on keeping their eligibility for 
the benefits in the NBLSS.  
 <Table 17> needs to be reviewed, which shows that work incentive is for 
special beneficiaries not for regular beneficiaries at least in the variable „work 
capability‟. Again, the effect of work ability on work incentive has been the greatest 
issue in last decade as a negative factor, but the one thing that can be proved by this 
study is that the effect of work ability on work incentive is not applicable to regular 
beneficiaries but to special beneficiaries. It needs to study about the tendency that 
special beneficiaries without work ability are likely to work more. Thus, it is not a 
surprise that special beneficiaries with work ability are less likely to try to work 
more. Moreover, it can be proved by the analysis on regular beneficiaries that 
regular beneficiaries with work ability are likely to work 8 weeks less and regular 
beneficiaries without work ability are likely to work 8 weeks more. There‟s no 
wonder about this result, because it is caused by the afore-said provision systems 
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encourage beneficiaries to keep the balance to be in a condition of either special 
beneficiaries or regular beneficiaries.  
 The last part is the analysis on the relation between health condition and 
working days.  An unhealthy special beneficiary is likely to work more about a 
month than healthy special beneficiaries as Beta: -1.831, sig.:0.000, and P < 0.01. 
Before continuing the analysis on the model, the result is very odd that unhealthy 
beneficiaries tend to work more than healthier special beneficiaries. If it is assumed 
that the „medication‟ is a type of special benefit provision, it is also effective on 
special beneficiaries to get special provision as medication entry. To keep the 
medication entry of special benefit provision, applicants have to pass the 
examination under certain criteria such as approved income, which is basically 
required not to exceed the minimum living cost.  
 To the end, the variable „age‟ affects work incentive most among the 
variables on working days according to the standardized coefficient β in appendix 
coefficients. Those analyses on the working days are explained with a possibility of 
99% confidence level except education level.  
 According to the analysis, the work days, being contrary to the assumption 
of this study, tend to be more in special beneficiaries than in regular beneficiaries. 
To interpret it in a different view, the fact that special beneficiaries, non-workable 
beneficiaries and unhealthy beneficiaries have more work days might point out 
again that the supplementary benefit scheme and the method of total payment, 
which have been pointed out as the biggest problem in work incentive of the 
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NBLSS. It is considered that special beneficiaries and regular beneficiaries tend to 
neglect escape from benefits and self-sufficiency which are considered as the 
fundamental objective and result of this system, but to consider the 
criteria(minimum livelihood expenses and a person under obligation to support) in 
order to keep the eligibility for benefits. 
 
 
<Table 18> Special BeneficiariesEffect on Earned Income 
 
 Dependent Variable 
Work Incentive 
Earned Income 
B β Sig. 
Independent 
Variable 






Gender 116.000 .128 .003*** 
Age -10.523 -.338 .000 
Marriage -192.276 -.187 .000 
Education 26.021 .074 .088 
Physical 
Factors 
Work Capability -80.058 -.194 .039** 
Health condition -93.545 -.080 .000 
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *P<0.1 
  
 <Table 18> shows the relationship between special beneficiaries and 
earned income. The special beneficiaries are 120.570 (unit: KRW10,000) times 
more likely to have a possibility to increase their income with 99% confidence level 
as Beta: 120.570, sig.:0.001, and P < 0.01. It is also explained by adjusted R square 
0.28 that estimated regression model data 28%. (See Appendix for summary of the 
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model such as value of R square).   
 The <Table 18> describes that male, younger, single, highly-educated, 
unhealthier, and non workable beneficiaries are more likely to earn income. To 
enumerate in detail, males among 46.2% of total special beneficiaries in NBLSS are 
more likely to earn income KRW 1,160,000 more than females as Beta: 116.000, 
sig.:0.003, and P < 0.01. In other words, the income KRW 1,160,000 is increasing 
with the same amount in every special beneficiary are chance to be a male.  
 However, the variable „age‟ indicates that those younger special 
beneficiaries are likely to earn KRW 100,000 more as Beta: -10.523, sig.:0.000, and 
P < 0.01. For example, special beneficiaries in 40‟s earn KRW 1,500,000, and 
special beneficiaries in 50‟s has a chance to earn KRW 1,920,000 more than special 
beneficiaries in 40‟s with very strong effect on the variable „earned income‟ among 
the six variables: gender, age, marriage, education level, health condition, and work 
ability. Additionally the standardized coefficient β shows the variable „age‟ is the 
most highly effective variable to the earned income.  
 The highest range of income is the variable „marriage‟ that KRW 
1,922,760 increases for every unit as Beta: -192.276, sig.:0.000, and P < 0.01. 
Interestingly, single special beneficiaries are more likely to earn KRW 1,922,760 
more than married special beneficiaries. To think of special beneficiaries, they also 
want to keep their provision as much as single special beneficiaries, so if they 
would like to keep the condition as beneficiaries, they should not earn a certain 
amount of money that the criteria stated. It is highly plausible that married special 
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beneficiaries earn a certain amount of money or they do not report their exact 
amount of money to keep the status of a special beneficiary. As it is mentioned 
above, the tendency of married beneficiaries not work are actually related to the 
work incentive. It is very simple that the tendency of beneficiaries is to remain as 
beneficiaries. The tendency not to leave the beneficiary status brings about negative 
effect on work incentive as <Table 18> shows that married special beneficiaries less 
likely earn income about KRW 1,922,760. As known well, public benefits effect on 
work incentive is negative, but in this case it cannot just draw the result as being 
negative because married special beneficiaries are possible to get paid less money 
than single beneficiaries.  
 Healthy special beneficiaries are less likely to earn income, but unhealthier 
special beneficiaries are likely to earn KRW 935,450 more than healthy special 
beneficiaries as Beta: -93.545, sig.:0.000, and P < 0.01. Thus, it becomes apparent 
that healthy special beneficiaries are likely neither to work more nor to earn more 
income than unhealthier special beneficiaries.   
 The last variable to discuss is the relation between work ability and earned 
income as shown in <Table 18>. The relation between the variable „work ability‟ 
and „earned income‟ is analogous to previous relations between work ability and 
working days. Undoubtedly, the variable „work ability‟ is definitely related to work 
incentive, and work incentive has often been argued as being in some way of 
negative effect on the NBLSS especially in work ability. Interestingly, the variable 
„work ability. has the least power to prove the relation between the variables „earn 
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income‟ and „work ability‟ among these independent variables. Needlessly to say, 
special beneficiaries with work ability are likely to earn KRW 800,000 less than 
special beneficiaries without work ability as Beta: -80.058, sig.:0.039, and P < 0.05. 
 Ultimately the findings from <Table 16>, <Table 17>, and <Table 18> 
illustrated that special beneficiaries are more likely to be in economic activities 
status, work more, and earned more income than regular beneficiaries. The 
hypothesis, as noted earlier, that the special beneficiaries under the NBLSS will 
have negative work incentive than regular beneficiaries, was confirmed. 
Consequently, the special beneficiaries under the NBLSS are positive in the effect 
on work incentive, but the regular beneficiaries under the NBLSS are negative in 
the effect on work incentive. Subsequently, the finding in this study is that special 
beneficiaries are more likely to be positive in work incentive than regular 
beneficiaries. This is to say, regular beneficiaries are less likely to earn their income 
while receiving the benefits under the NBLSS.  
 The result of analysis on work age which is the final dependant variable as 
a work incentive shows the resultant value which is contrary to the assumption of 
this study. The fact that special beneficiaries earn 1.2 million won more than regular 
beneficiaries reflects that there is a problem in the benefit payment under this 














 The role of the NBLSS as the basic rule is getting bigger, which is the last 
social security net that the government guarantees the minimum livelihood of 
people. The result of this study shows that the „all or nothing‟ benefit system under 
the current NBLSS, under which benefits are provided on the basis of approved 
income subject to combination of integrated benefit system and supplementary 
benefit regulation, may make beneficiaries decrease labor supply or hide economic 
activities and earned income in order to maintain the eligibility for benefits, instead 
of escape from poverty through labor. In other words, the assertion of Moffitt(2002) 
was proved, that if approved income increases to exceed the minimum livelihood 
expenses, the eligibility for the livelihood benefit is lost, and that for other major 
benefits(healthcare, education, residence, self-support, etc.) is lost also; therefore, 
actual income decreases drastically to be less than that before the escape from such 
benefits.  Thus, there may be the phenomenon that beneficiaries under the NBLSS 
decrease labor supply at a certain time when their earned income increases, not to 
lose the eligibility for the benefits. 
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 As seen above, the beneficiaries in this system tend to avoid working 
provide minimal work to main the eligibility for benefits. As discussed in literature 
review and work incentive, all-or-nothing system which consists of supplementary 
benefit system and integrated benefit payment system decline the work incentive of 
beneficiaries, and the low security level and wide dead angle drop the work 
incentive of special beneficiaries.  This reversely proves the hypothesis of this that 
the work incentive of special beneficiaries would be lower than that of regular 
beneficiaries. 
It satisfies the hypothesis of this study in dependence on the welfare path 
since special beneficiaries receiving more benefits than regular beneficiaries have a 
stronger tendency not to lose the benefit status, so they could not avoid depending 
on the welfare path; however, it needs to reject the hypothesis since special 
beneficiaries have higher work incentive than regular beneficiaries. To interpret in 
another way, about 19% of special beneficiaries were workable, being 109 out of 
576; and about 53% of regular beneficiaries were workable. Under this assumption, 
The fact that above 50% of regular beneficiaries have negative tendency in work 
incentive shows benefit provision under the NBLSS has been inappropriate (see 
Appendix on benefit level evaluation); and the fact that special beneficiaries among 
whom 20% or less are workable have positive tendency in work incentive shows 
they work to supplement lacking benefit individually (see Appendix). 
The existing benefit provision system which used to be integrated will be 
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changed to the welfare system of paying the benefits by different levels after 
selecting the beneficiaries for special benefits (residence, healthcare and education) 
by steps in October, 2014. This will be much helpful not only for the welfare of 
people in unprivileged condition of welfare but also for special beneficiaries who 
are main targets, and it is expected that this will influence inducing the normal 
beneficiaries of the NBLSS excluding a certain period of time and a certain group 
(special beneficiaries). 
Therefore, this study on the work incentive of special beneficiaries is significant 
because it is possible to indirectly predict the effect on future change of benefit 
providing system for special beneficiaries. However, it needs to consider the 
possibilities that the concerned authorities would handle each kind of benefit by 
introduction of individual benefits; that the right of beneficiaries may be weakened; 
and that practical livelihood is not secured due to practical dissolution of the 
minimum livelihood expenses. Furthermore, this leads to the conclusion that the 
new benefit system for special beneficiaries by levels, which will be introduced in 
2014, will increase the work incentive of special beneficiaries; and eventually, the 
effect of the coming change in the benefit system is expected to be positive.  
In conclusion it was intended to find sustainable effects of the two groups 
who are regular beneficiaries and special beneficiaries, however, one recent year 
was used for this study, so transverse section was reviewed instead of longitudinal 
section, so the sustainable characteristics of welfare benefits were missed, which is 
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considered as the marginal point. In addition, missing value exists due to the 
characteristics of beneficiaries under the NBLSS, and reducing it may bring more 
accurate results of study. 
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Step -2 Log likelihood Cox & Snell R Square Nagelkerke R Square 
1 307.308 .126 .259 
 
 
Economic Activities Tests of Model Coefficients 
 χ2(Chi-square) F Significant 
Step 1 Steps 77.624 7 .000 
Block 77.624 7 .000 




Step χ2(Chi-square) F Significant 
1 6.169 8 .628 
Variables in the Equation 
 B S.E, Wald F Significant Exp(B) 
Step 1a Special 
beneficiarys 
.441 .315 1.957 1 .102 1.554 
Gender .325 .339 .919 1 .338 1.384 
Age -.060 .014 17.343 1 .000 .942 
Marriage -.273 .369 .545 1 .460 .761 
Education -.020 .145 .019 1 .889 .980 
Health condition -.062 .156 .157 1 .692 .940 
Work Capability -18.776 2997.929 .000 1 .995 .000 
Constant 20.352 2997.929 .000 1 .995 6.899E8 
a. Variable(s) entered on step 1:Specialbeneficiarys, Gender, Age, Marriage, Education, Health 









Model Summary  
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. of the Estimate 
1 .561a .315 .306 4.10566 
2 .561b .314 .307 4.10322 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Work Capability, Gender, Special, Education level, Health Condition, 
Marriage, Age 










Model Sum of 
Squared d.f 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 4395.309 7 627.901 37.250 .000a 
Residual 9574.441 568 16.856   
Total 13969.750 575    
2 Regression 4389.847 6 731.641 43.456 .000b 
Residual 9579.903 569 16.836   
Total 13969.750 575    
a. Predictors: (Constant), Work Capability, Gender, Special, Education level, Health Condition, 
Marriage, Age 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Work Capability, Gender, Special, Health Condition, Marriage, Age 














t Sig. B S.E. β 
1 Constant 16.195 1.495  10.835 .000 
Special .957 .397 .084 2.408 .016 
Gender 1.429 .417 .145 3.423 .001 
Age -.123 .015 -.364 -8.247 .000 
Marriage -1.631 .465 -.146 -3.509 .000 
Education level .093 .163 .024 .569 .569 
Health Condition -.967 .193 -.184 -5.021 .000 
Work Capability -1.844 .413 -.169 -4.466 .000 
2 Constant 16.774 1.094  15.330 .000 
Special .966 .397 .085 2.433 .015 
Gender 1.402 .414 .142 3.383 .001 
Age -.128 .013 -.377 -9.996 .000 
Marriage -1.648 .464 -.147 -3.553 .000 
Health Condition -.974 .192 -.185 -5.073 .000 
Work Capability -1.831 .412 -.168 -4.443 .000 














2 Education level .024a .569 .569 .024 .665 
a. Predictors Model: (Constant), _Work Capability, Gender, Special, Health Condition, Marriage, Age 
b. Dependent: Total Work Days 
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Model Summary  
Model R R Square AdjustedR Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
1 .539a .290 .281 383.99940 





Model Sum of 
Squared df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 3.423E7 7 4890406.959 33.165 .000a 
Residual 8.375E7 568 147455.537   
Total 1.180E8 575    
a. Predictors: (Constant), Special, Marriage, , Health Condition, Work Capability, Gender, 
Education level 










t Sig. B 
Std. 
Error β 
1 Constant 1313.476 139.792  9.396 .000 
Gender 116.000 39.041 .128 2.971 .003 
Age -10.523 1.397 -.338 -7.533 .000 
Marriage -192.276 43.478 -.187 -4.422 .000 
Education level 26.021 15.231 .074 1.708 .088 
Health Condition -93.545 18.008 -.194 -5.195 .000 
Work Capability -80.058 38.627 -.080 -2.073 .039 
Special 120.570 37.166 .116 3.244 .001 





Capability to work in Beneficiarys 
Work Capability Total Number Percentage 
SpecialBeneficiarys 576 109 19% 




Estimation Level of the NBLSS Benefits 
Division Enough Good Normal Lack 
Very 
Lack 
Special Beneficiarys Number 5 21 23 86 10 
Special Beneficiarys 
Percentage 
3.4 14.48 15.86 59.3 6.9 
Regular Beneficiarys Number 16 32 97 249 37 
Regular Beneficiarys 
Percentage 



















1997년 외환위기로 이후 생계유지가 곤란한 저소득층이 증가함에 따라 
국가가 모든 국민의 기본적인 생활을 제도적으로 보장해주어야 한다는 
보편적 복지의 필요성이 대두되었다. 이에 따라 2000년 10월 
국민기초생활보장제도가 도입되었고 이로써 이전에 근로능력이 있는 
복지 대상자에게는 현금지원이 이루어지지 않았던 과거와 달리 자활사업 
참여를 조건으로 근로능력이 있는 빈곤계층에까지 현금지원을 
시행함으로써 수급범위가 확대되었다. 국민기초생활보장제도는 사회의 
최종안전망이자 국민권리의 기본법으로서 국가가 국민의 최저생계수준을 
보장한다는 점에서 의의가 있는 제도라고 할 수 있다. 
 그러나 최저생활보장과 함께 국민의 자활을 유도하고자 하는 양대 
목적을 가지는 국민기초생활보장제도는 근로유인에 있어 제도적 
문제점을 가진다는 지적이 되어왔다. 국민기초생활보장제도의 지원이 
수급자들로 하여금 오히려 수급자격을 유지하기 위해 오히려 근로를 
기피하거나 수급자격을 유지할 수 있는 최소한의 근로만을 제공하는 등 
근로증가의 반대되는 결과를 유도할 수 있기 때문이다. 실제 소득인정액 
수준이 최저생계비 이하일 경우 그 차액을 보전해 주는 보충급여방식과 
급여수급의 자격조건이 충족되면 특례수급 또한 일괄적으로 지급받지만 
자격을 상실하면 아무것도 받지 못하는 통합적 지급방식(all or 
nothing)은 수급자로 하여금 수급지위를 벗어나지 않으려는 
복지의존성을 심화시켜 결국 근로유인을 해치는 요인으로 논의되어왔다. 
또한 낮은 보장수준과 넓은 제도의 사각지대는 수급자 집단 중 특히 
특례수급자 집단의 근로유인을 저하시킬 우려가 있어 보인다. 
 이에 본 연구는 일반수급자집단에 비해 해당 급여를 더 받는 
특례수급자집단이 복지에 대한 의존성이 더 클 것이라는 가정에 따라 
특례수급자 집단의 근로유인 또한 일반수급자 집단 보다 더 낮을 
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것이라는 가설을 수립하였다. 이에 국민기초생활보장제도 수급자 집단을 
일반수급자 집단과 특례수급자 집단으로 구분한 뒤 경제활동여부, 
근로일수, 근로소득을 포함하는 근로유인에 어떻게 영향을 미치는지 
분석하였다.  
 분석결과 특례수급자 집단의 근로유인은 정(+)으로 나타난 반면 
일반수급자 집단의 근로유인은 오히려 부(-)로 나타났다. 다른 각도에서 
재해석하면 특례수급자 집단의 경우 일할 능력이 있는 자가 576명 중 
109명으로 약 19%이며 일반수급자 집단의 경우 약 53%의 일할 능력이 
있는 자들로 구성되어있다는 점을 고려할 때, 일할 능력이 50%가 넘는 
일반수급자 집단에서 근로유인이 부정적으로 나타났다는 것은 
수급자들의 급여수준 평가를 통해 국민기초생활보장제도 상의 
수급제공이 적절하지 않았다고 판단할 수 있다. 또한 일할 능력이 
20%도 안 되는 특례수급자 집단에서 근로유인이 긍정적으로 나타났다는 
것은 낮은 급여수준을 개별적으로 보충하기 위해 근로를 한다고 결론 
내릴 수 있다. 결국 모든 수급자는 수급자격을 유지할 수 있는 최소한의 
근로를 제공한다고 해석할 수 있다.  
 본 연구는 이러한 통합급여체계와 보충급여원칙이 결합되어 
소득인정액을 기준으로 한 현재의 국민기초생활보장제도의 통합적 
지급방식(all or nothing)의 복지급여지급은 수급자에게 근로를 통한 
빈곤탈출보다는 수급권 유지를 위해 노동공급을 줄이거나 경제활동 및 
근로소득을 은폐하려는 유인을 제공할 가능성이 있음을 시사한다.  
 기 연구에서 밝혀진 바 대로 소득인정액이 최저생계비 이상으로 
증가하면 생계급여의 자격을 잃게 되며 동시에 다른 주요급여(의료, 교육, 
주거, 자활급여 등)의 수급자격을 잃게 되므로 실질적인 소득이 수급탈피 
이전보다 급격히 감소하게 됨은 당연하다. 따라서 분석을 바탕으로 
국민기초생활 수급자는 근로소득이 수급자격기준을 초과하지 않도록 
근로소득 증가의 일정 지점에서 근로를 줄이는 현상이 발생하는 것으로 
볼 수 있다.  
 2014년에 시행될 특례수급자 집단을 대상으로 한 새로운 단계별 
급여체계가 특례수급자 집단의 근로유인을 높힌다는 결론을 
가져옴으로써 앞으로 있을 급여체계변동의 효과는 긍정적인 효과를 거둘 
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것으로 예상된다. 따라서 특례수급자 집단을 중심으로 그들의 근로유인을 
분석한 본 연구는 특례수급자 집단의 급여전달 체계변동에 대한 효과를 
간접적으로 예측할 수 있다는 점에서 의의가 있다. 하지만 개별급여 
도입으로 급여별 보장기관이 달라지고 이로 인해 수급권자의 권리 
실현이 약화될 가능성과 최저생계비의 실질적인 해체로 인해 보다 
실질적인 생계보장이 이루어지지 않을 가능성을 고려해야한다. 
 
주요어: 특례수급자, 근로유인, 국민기초생활보장제도, 노동정책, 
공공부조 
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